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STATINTL

Former CIA Chief 'Explains'

Dulles: There Was No Missile Gap

New York
Allen W. Dulles, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, denies that there was ever a "missile gap" or a "bomber gap" between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Mr. Dulles, who headed the CIA for eight years, says that incorrect assessments of the adversary's intentions, not intelligence "failures," were the cause of these rumors.

"There was hard evidence of Soviet capability to produce bombers at a certain rate if they so desired. At the same time of the estimate, the available evidence indicated that they did so desire, and intended to translate this capability into an actual program," he writes in a special supplement that appears in the April issue of Harper's magazine.

Speculation Recalled

"All this led to speculation in this country as to a 'bomber gap.' However, production did not rise as rapidly as had seemed likely; evidence accumulated that the performance of the heavy bomber was less than satisfactory. At some point, probably about 1957 the Soviet leaders apparently decided to limit heavy-bomber production drastically. The bomber gap never materialized."

Speculation about the "missile gap" developed because the Department of Defense put "great pressure" on the CIA to evaluate reports they had been given of a Soviet missile buildup, Mr. Dulles reports.

"Early figures of Soviet missile production had to be developed on the basis of estimated production and development capabilities over a period in the future," writes Mr. Dulles in his article.

Questions Raised

"Once again we had to decide how the Soviet Union would allocate its total military effort. How much of it would go into missiles? How much into developing the nuclear potential? . . .

"It was due to this measure of incertitude during the late 1950's that the national debate over the so-called missile gap developed. Then, based on certain proven capabilities of the Soviets and on our view of their intentions and overall strategy, estimates were made as to the number of missiles and nuclear warheads which would be available and on launchers several years in the future."

The problems facing the esti-

mators in the CIA, says Mr. Dulles, were to decide whether the Soviets would put their early, awkward ICBM's into quantity production and deploy them on to launch sites, or whether they would go slowly and choose a more "orderly" program.

Estimates Revised

"The answer, in retrospect," he writes, "seems to be that they chose the more orderly program. As soon as this evidence appeared, the ICBM estimates—as in the case of the bombers—were quickly revised downward."

Mr. Dulles's long article, titled "The Craft of Intelligence," reviews the role of intelligence throughout history. It will be expanded into a book which Harper & Row will publish next fall.

In the article, Mr. Dulles discloses that in 1944, when Thomas E. Dewey was running against Franklin D. Roosevelt for President, Mr. Dewey learned that the government had apparently, before Pearl Harbor, failed to make the best use of successes in breaking Japanese codes. There was concern that Mr. Dewey might refer to this in his campaign.

Appeal to Candidate

"The mere possibility sent shivers down the spines of our Joint Chiefs of Staff," says Mr. Dulles. "General Marshall himself appealed personally to Mr. Dewey in a letter to keep patriotic considerations above partisan politics. Mr. Dewey never mentioned our code successes."

Commenting on the work of the CIA and of intelligence operations in general, Mr. Dulles makes the following statements in his Harper's article:

• "The funds for CIA's operations are provided by appropriations voted by Congress, and the amount and the general breakdown of expenditures are known to the relevant subcommittees of the Appropriations Committees of the Congress. As the total is not made public, many writers on the subject feel they are privileged to make their own guesses.

Since one billion dollars is a good round figure, this is the one they generally assign as the annual budgetary expenditure of the CIA. That guess has no relation whatever to reality, and the actual amount while I was director would be somewhat more com-

forting to the American taxpayer than the inflated guesses."

• "Some of the most important, also some of the most recent, Soviet defectors to the West have so far chosen not to be 'surfaced.' Their defections and their identities have remained secret; but they have made, and are making, a continual contribution to our inside knowledge of the work of the Soviet intelligence and security apparatus."

• "Whenever a dramatic event occurs in the foreign-relations field—an event for which the public may not have been prepared—one can usually count on the cry going up, 'Intelligence has failed again.' The charge may at times be correct. But there are also many occasions when an event has been foreseen and correctly estimated but intelligence has been unable to advertise its success."

• "If we were to set out to estimate what our own policy decisions would be a few years hence, we would soon be lost in a forest of uncertainty. And yet our estimators are called upon to decide what others will do. Unfortunately the intelligence process of making estimates will never become an exact science."

• "Many Communist parties and front organizations throughout the world have been penetrated. Because of the nature of the subversive activities in which the various Communist parties are engaged and the large numbers of untrained personnel involved, it is difficult for them to maintain adequate security and secrecy."

• "It is an established rule not only that the CIA should keep out of policy matters but that its personnel should keep out of politics."